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Abstract
Constructivism is the most dynamically evolving concept in the sociology of social 
problems1 . The research projects based on this paradigm, especially those dedicated 
to corruption, provide valuable insights and opportunities to formulate conclusions on 
the nature of this phenomenon, which would be difficult to derive from other theoretical 
traditions2 . The main purpose of this paper is to show how a constructivist approach 
might be used to better understand the nature of modern corruption, and why one of 
the most popular solutions nowadays, anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), so often fail . The 
author’s main argument is that one of the most important reasons why the ACAs fail is 
strongly related to how a social problem of corruption is constructed .
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1 E . Rubington, M . S . Weinberg, The Study of Social Problems. Seven Perspectives (Sixth Edition), Oxford 
University Press, New York 2003; S . Woolgar, D . Pawluch, How Shall We Move Beyond Constructivism, 
“Social Problems” 1985, Vol . 3, No . 2, p . 159–162; J . Best, Constructionism in Context, in: J . Best (Ed .), 
Images of Issues: Typifying Contemporary Social Problems, New York 1995 .
2 V . Pavarala, Interpreting Corruption. Elite Perspectives in India, Sage Publications, New Delhi 1996; 
I . Krastev, When “Should” Does Not Imply “Can” The Making of the Washington Consensus on Corruption, 
in: W . Lepenies (Ed .), Entangled Histories and Negotiated Universals: Centers and Peripheries in a Changing 
World, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt 2000: G . Makowski, Korupcja jako problem społeczny, Trio, Warsaw 2008 .
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Agencje antykorupcyjne – cudowne panaceum przeciwko 
korupcji czy piąte koło u wozu? Analiza z perspektywy 
konstruktywistycznej teorii problemów społecznych
Streszczenie
Konstruktywizm to najbardziej dynamicznie rozwijająca się koncepcja w socjologii 
problemów społecznych3 . Projekty badawcze oparte na tym paradygmacie, zwłaszcza 
te poświęcone korupcji, dostarczają cennych informacji i umożliwiają formułowanie 
wniosków na temat natury tego zjawiska, co byłoby trudne do osiągnięcia na podstawie 
innych teoretycznych tradycji4 . Głównym celem tego artykułu jest pokazanie, w jaki 
sposób konstruktywistyczne podejście może być zastosowane, aby lepiej zrozumieć 
naturę współczesnej korupcji i dlaczego jedno z najbardziej popularnych rozwiązań 
w dzisiejszych czasach, agencje antykorupcyjne (ACAS), tak często zawodzą . Według 
autora jeden z najważniejszych powodów, dlaczego ACAS nie są skuteczne, jest silnie 
związany z tym jak problem społeczny korupcji jest skonstruowany .
Słowa kluczowe: problemy społeczne, konstruktywizm, korupcja, agencje antykorupcyjne
Constructing and converting social problems
One of the most recent and interesting variants of the constructivist approach is 
Jamrozik’s theory of the residualist conversion of social problems . Within his concept 
a social problem is a set of circumstances, attitudes, processes and structures, per-
ceived and defined by people as threatening to their values , objectives, hierarchies, 
or moral standards or to institutions considered by the society or given groups to be 
essential to maintain social stability5 . Those who signalize problems and demand 
changes in constructivist theories are called claims-makers .
3 E . Rubington, M . S . Weinberg, The Study of Social Problems. Seven Perspectives (Sixth Edition), Oxford 
University Press, New York 2003; S . Woolgar, D . Pawluch, How Shall We Move Beyond Constructivism, 
“Social Problems” 1985, Vol . 3, No . 2, s . 159–162; J . Best, Constructionism in Context, w: J . Best (Ed .), 
Images of Issues: Typifying Contemporary Social Problems, New York 1995 .
4 V . Pavarala, Interpreting Corruption. Elite Perspectives in India, Sage Publications, New Delhi 
1996; I . Krastev, When “Should” Does Not Imply “Can” The Making of the Washington Consensus on 
Corruption, w: W . Lepenies (Ed .), Entangled Histories and Negotiated Universals: Centers and Peripheries 
in a Changing World, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt 2000: G . Makowski, Korupcja jako problem społeczny, 
Trio, Warszawa 2008 .
5 A . Jamrozik, L . Nocella, The Sociology of Social Problems. Theoretical Perspectives and Methods of 
Intervention, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998; G . Makowski, op .cit .
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Social problems are phenomena in which a paradox is always embedded – on 
the one hand, they are a real or putative source of threat to social norms and values, 
on the other hand they occur as a result of efforts to realize the standards, values  and 
goals that are based on those values . Hence, Jamrozik also defines social problems as 
the negative residues of efforts of society to achieve its objectives arising from the par-
ticular normative system . This also means that social problems are structural in their 
nature; they are built into concrete social arrangements and are reproduced by them .
Taking this into account an important conclusion is that the key to solving any 
social problem always lies in the hands of those who can make a systemic change 
possible – the authorities – since they are the guardians of the normative order, and 
their mission is to secure public interest and shape public policies . If social problems 
are structural, then they can be resolved only by changing the system or at least some 
significant part of it . This always means redefinition of some fundamental social 
values  and societal goals .
Construction and further conversion of social problems depend on many factors . 
One of the most important is so called the “organizational ownership” of the problem6 . 
In short, this is the ability to label certain phenomena (putative or real) as problems 
and undertake actions against them . Ownership is the ability to manipulate the 
meaning, definition of the problem and to manage it, but it is also a set of obligations 
and responsibilities for formulation of policy towards the problem .
Owners and forms of ownership of social problems change over time . There are at 
least three types of actors competing for organizational ownership of social problems . 
In the first group there are all those (groups, organizations, social movements or 
individuals) who make claims; they initiate the process of constructing social prob-
lems, they name given circumstances or situations (real or putative) as problematic . 
They bring the problems to the public arena (usually through all kinds of media) and 
demand a reaction from the authorities . “Moral entrepreneurs” and “do-gooders” 
usually have a particularly strong sense of ownership, and are strongly motivated 
by some fundamental (moral or religious) values, interests or beliefs . Consequently, 
they are the first to own the problem .
Another category of actors seeking organizational ownership of the problems 
are the authorities themselves; they decide to legitimize claims and naturally want 
to take over the ownership of the problem . Sometimes authorities even take the role 
of claims-makers and own the problems from the very beginning7 . By generating 
6 J . R . Gusfield, Constructing the Ownership of Social Problems: Fun and Profit in the Welfare State, 
“Social Problems” 1989, Vol . 36, No . 5, 431–441 .
7 J . W . Schneider, Social Problems Theory: The Constructionist View, “Annual Reviews” 1985, No . 11, 
209–229; Girard R ., Kozioł ofiarny, Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, Łódź 1991 .
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social problems they want to show how effective they are in protecting society and 
the public interest8 . In any case, as public policy makers they are naturally interested 
in such a reformulation of a social problem that it will not undermine their compe-
tences as actors responsible for securing the public interest .
Finally, the third major category of actors aspiring to own social problems are 
agencies and institutions (the referral agencies or helping professions) formed by the 
authorities to implement public policies, e .g . labor offices, social welfare institutions 
and law enforcement bodies . Anti-corruption agencies, to which the second part of 
this paper is devoted, also belong to this category9 . These actors are active at an 
operational level . They create a source of practical, specialized knowledge about the 
problem which they are dealing with, tending at the same time to hide this knowledge, 
because it gives them autonomy and a stronger position towards other competitors 
for ownership of the problem . The functioning of such institutions is characterized 
by a symbiotic relationship with the problem – helping professions work best when 
the problem is personalized, when they have their own “problem population” . It 
is then easy to “feed” the problem by adjusting individual cases of “deviation” or 
“pathology” to the operational definition of the problem, which such institutions 
use for their daily purposes, to maintain the problem . Often, the existence of such 
groups, in addition to being a specialized knowledge resource, becomes the sine qua 
non condition for the existence of a referral agency or helping profession . When such 
institutions are the owners, they often become more interested in maintaining the 
problem at a reasonable scale – big enough to ensure that their existence makes sense . 
This often means attempting to adjust and extend the definition of the problem, so it 
covers a wider range of individuals or behaviors that should be treated as problematic .
Corruption as social problem
From the constructivist perspective the precise definition of corruption is not as 
important as specific features of this phenomenon10 . One such feature is that cor-
ruption is undeniably related to the functioning of public authorities . Corruption is 
always a question of power and, in particular, a question of the public authorities11 .
8 J . W . Schneider, op .cit .
9 J . R . Gusfield, Constructing the Ownership of Social Problems: Fun and Profit in the Welfare State, 
“Social Problems” 1989, Vol . 36, No . 5, 431–441 .
10 G . Makowski, op .cit; V . Pavrala, op .cit .
11 J . Kurczewski, Czy możliwa jest socjologia korupcji?, in: J . Kurczewski, B . Łaciak (Ed .), Korupcja 
w życiu społecznym, ISP, Warsaw 2000 .
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This feature is also the reason why, in most cases, the bottom-up process attempts 
to construct corruption as a social problem are unsuccessful . Recognizing corruption 
as a social problem and legitimizing it officially as such, like no other phenomenon, 
calls into question the position, competences, and eventually the ability of author-
ities to preserve the socio-political status quo . This is why authorities naturally are 
unwilling to recognize this threat . Therefore, the process of constructing corruption 
as a social problem has rather a top-down than bottom-up character – if the author-
ities discover that there is some use for this – e .g . to discredit political opponents .
There is another possibility for constructing corruption as a social problem . Often, 
whether it becomes a social problem in a particular country or not is determined 
by international pressure12 . Institutions such as the European Union, OECD, UN, 
World Bank or influential international non-governmental organizations such as 
the Transparency International may act as really powerful claim-makers . They are 
capable of efficiently producing public discourse on corruption motivating the public 
authorities (governments) to take action, forcing them to legitimize corruption as 
a social problem . This fact is of great importance for the construction and conversion 
processes and, as we will see later, for the anti-corruption agencies . In such situations 
organizational ownership of the social problem of corruption usually remains in the 
hands of international organizations . They keep the ownership even when corruption 
becomes a problem legitimized by national governments . Using international conven-
tions and programs these organizations often have the final word about definitions 
of corruption and actions that should be undertaken in particular countries13 .
This creates a specific situation in which governments are forced to take re-
sponsibility for creating anti-corruption policies, but without having ownership of 
the problem . Under pressure from international organizations, they cannot contest 
the threat anymore and must legitimize the social problem of corruption, develop 
anti-corruption policies and implement them . At the same time, international organi-
zations seldom demand real systemic changes (e .g . reform of political party financing, 
administrative changes or deeper fundamental reformulation of the constitutional 
order in a country) – simply because they don’t have the mandate to interfere with 
12 I . Krastev, A . Stoyanov, Prime Minister’s Dilemma: Do Non-Corrupt Governments, “Working Paper 
Collegium”, Budapest 2003, www .colbud .hu/honesty-trust/krastev/pub03 .doc . Accessed 11 August 2012; 
A . Sík, The Bad, the Worse and the Worst: Guesstimating the Level of Corruption, in: A . Sajó, S . Kotkin 
(Ed .), Political Corruption in Transition: A Skeptic’s Handbook, CEU Press, New York 2002, p . 91–114 .
13 I . Krastev, When “Should” Does Not Imply “Can” The Making of the Washington Consensus on 
Corruption, Fribourg Institute of Federalism, Fribourg 2003; G . Makowski, op .cit ., p . 279–288; I . Krastev, 
A . Stoyanov, op .cit .
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national policies14 (Polzer, 2001) . Therefore the chances of solving the problem of 
corruption by some systemic change is rather small .
Also personalization (what in brief means identifying the source of the problem 
in concrete groups or individuals15 of the social problem of corruption is almost 
impossible under such conditions, what would not be a solution of course, but from 
the point of view of governments this could make corruption more manageable . 
The authorities cannot easily determine a problem population – they cannot point 
to who a “convenient enemy” or “scapegoat” is . It is difficult because these authori-
ties (political parties, government and public administration) are the ones who are 
usually blamed for corruption by society . In such circumstances, the authorities try 
to find and blame some particular socio-professional group (e .g . low level officials 
or public health employees) . In such a situation they are able to maintain the status 
quo only by diffusing the social problem of corruption . Putting the responsibility 
for corruption on everyone means presenting it as a problem of the whole society, as 
a cultural problem, as a phenomenon deeply rooted in the national history, etc . Only 
conversion by diffusion gives the authorities an opportunity to distance themselves 
from the problem and define their role as the only body able to find good solutions .
There is one important constraint, however . Diffused corruption is difficult 
to convert into a technical issue, as there is no specific “problem population” to blame . 
Conversion in this form usually ends at the “administrative level”, where only some 
general strategies are implemented; sometimes institutions responsible for solving 
a problem are reorganized; or educational activities are undertaken . When corruption 
is diffused, an attempt to go deeper, to the operational level, and deal with it by cre-
ating specific helping professions, e .g . special anti-corruption agencies, might not be 
very effective . The main difficulty is to formulate the mission and mandate of such 
institutions and assign to them proper resources (financial, human and technical) .
Nevertheless, governments (especially in developing countries) under international 
pressure decide to establish such “anti-corruption helping professions” . An overview 
of such institutions suggests that in most cases they are rather dysfunctional . The 
main hypothesis of this article is that their defects are related to the diffused nature 
of modern corruption . Before arguments for this standpoint will be presented and 
some illustrations from available research, it will be useful to define what an an-
ti-corruption agency is .
14 T . Polzer, Corruption: Deconstructing the World Bank Discourse, LSE Working Papers 2001, http://
www2 .lse .ac .uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP18 .pdf . Accessed 11 August 2012 .
15 See: G . Makowski, op .cit, p . 95–96 .
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Anti-corruption agency – definition and brief history
Within the ANCORAGE-NET project16, devoted to the anti-corruption agencies, 
several pioneering studies have already been conducted . Researchers involved in this 
initiative propose a definition of the ACAs, according to which such institutions are 
“[…] public bodies of a durable nature, with a specific mission to fight corruption 
and reducing the opportunity structures propitious for its occurrence in society 
through preventive and/or repressive measures . Independently of their format and 
powers […]”17 .
One of the first OECD reports on ACAs defined them as “ […] permanent agen-
cies whose primary function is to provide centralized leadership in one or more of 
the core areas of anti-corruption activity – including policy, analysis and technical 
assistance in prevention, public outreach and information, monitoring, investigation, 
and prosecution”18 Unlike the ANCORAGE-NET researchers, the OECD definition 
immediately points out some specific features of the ACAs . Following the OECD 
definition, one may distinguish three major types of a central anti-corruption agency 
(Meagher, 2007):
• Multi-purpose agencies – combining several functions – policy making, research, 
educational, also law enforcement (e .g . the Singaporean Corrupt Practices In-
vestigation Bureau (CPIB), the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) in Hong Kong or New South Wales in Australia) .
• Law enforcement agencies – these are basically law enforcement bodies or secret 
services . Such institutions exist, for example, in Norway, Spain and Belgium . 
Close to this type of the ACA is also the Polish Central Anti-corruption Bureau .
• Preventive, policy development and co-ordination institutions – the ACAs with 
a loose structure and generally defined purposes – commissions, councils or 
other collective bodies composed of representatives of other institutions – police, 
prosecution and other law enforcement agencies, etc . (e .g . the ACAs operating 
in France, Slovenia or in the USA) .
The special groups of prosecutors and police investigative teams which operated 
in New York in the seventies of the nineteenth century are considered to be the 
16 http://ancorage-net .org/
17 L . de Sousa, Anti-corruption Agencies: Between Empowerment and Irrelevance. Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 2009, http://ancorage-net .org/content/documents/anti-cor-
ruption%20agencies%20between%20empowerment%20and%20irrelevance .pdf . Accessed 11 August 2012 .
18 P . Meagher, Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Review of Experience, University of Maryland: Center for 
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, 2004, p . 3 .
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ancestors of modern anti-corruption agencies19 . Around the same time as in the U . S . 
similar initiatives were undertaken in some Asian countries .
In 1937, Singapore adopted special anti-corruption legislation, Prevention of 
Corruption Ordinance, establishing a permanent police unit dedicated to fighting 
corruption20 . In 1952 this unit was transformed to the Corrupt Practices Investigation 
Bureau (CPIB) . The CPIB became famous only after the reforms which this insti-
tution went through in the following twenty years21 . The Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong, established in 1974, is also among the 
oldest central anti-corruption bodies . Nowadays the ICAC remains the largest and 
best-funded anti-corruption agency in the world . It was also recognized as the best 
model to follow for countries such as Brunei, Uganda and Zambia (although it is 
worth noting that operating of the ICAC in most cases did not bring the expected 
results, for reasons that will be explained later) .
Portugal was the first European country to establish an anti-corruption agency 
– Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupção, formed on the model of Singapore’s CPIB . 
In 1988, based on the experience of Hong Kong’s ICAC, a similar commission was 
established in New South Wales (Australia) .
In the seventies and eighties of the twentieth century most of the ACAs were 
established as the best remedy to the institutional weaknesses of postcolonial states22 . 
Countries which received independence inherited from their masters a political 
system and administrative structures which did not fit the local culture and society . 
Therefore these new states were more exposed to corruption . The response to this 
threat was, among others, the establishment of special anti-corruption bodies .
The second wave of popularity of the ACAs was the beginning of the nineties . 
During this time the United Nations intensified its anti-corruption efforts . The UN 
Development Program started implementing projects aimed at strengthening public 
administration in developing countries23 . With the expansion of the free market econ-
omy, many authoritarian regimes decided to implement reforms, hoping to attract 
19 P . Meagher, Anti-corruption Agencies: Rhetoric Versus Reality, “Journal of Policy Reform” 2005, 
Vol . 8, No . 1, p . 70 .
20 J . S . T . Quah, Defying Institutional Failure: Learning from the Experiences of Anti-Corruption Agencies 
in Four Asian Countries . Presentation for the conference: Empowering Anti-Corruption Agencies: Defying 
Institutional Failure and Strengthening Preventive and Repressive Capacities, Lisboa, 14–16 May 2008, 
http://ancorage-net .org/content/documents/quah .pdf . Accessed 11 August 2012 .
21 J . R . Heilbrunn, Anti-Corruption Commissions Panacea, The World Bank Working Paper 2006, 
http://wbi .worldbank .org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/Anti-Corruption%20Com-
missions%20by%20John%20Heilbrunn .pdf . Accessed 11 August 2012 .
22 J . S . T . Quah, Combating Corruption in Singapore: What Can Be Learned?, “Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management” 2001, Vol . 9, No . 1, p . 29–35 .
23 G . Makowski, Korupcja…, op .cit .; UNDP, Mainstreaming Anti-Corruption in Development, UNDP, 
New York 2008 .
006_SzPP 3_2016.indb   62 01/03/17   10:32
63Anti-corruption Agencies – Silver Bullet Against Corrupion or Fifth Wheel to a Coach?...
nr 3(11)2016
foreign investors . The UN directly supported the creation of several ACAs in Africa . 
In the early nineties agencies were established in Tanzania (1991), Ghana (1993) and 
Malawi (1995) . Also, other institutions such as the U . S . development agency USAID 
or its British equivalent, the Department for International Development (DFID) 
promoted the ACAs as one of the best methods of curbing corruption .
However, the greatest growth in the number of the ACAs around the world is 
associated with the formulation of a global anti-corruption policy framework . This 
happened mainly due to the efforts of the UN, OECD, World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and other international institutions24 . The breakthrough was particu-
larly visible between 1995–1997, when the World Bank developed documents and 
recommendations requiring beneficiary states to implement national anti-corruption 
policies . At the end of the nineties, the European Union also joined the international 
front against corruption . The European Commission put strong pressure on the 
Central Eastern European countries aspiring to membership of the EU to develop 
special anti-corruption programs . Thus, in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, 
the majority of anti-corruption agencies were created during the accession process 
or shortly after joining the European Union25 .
***
To sum up, the available data on anti-corruption agencies show that at least three 
phases in the historical development of these institutions can be distinguished . The 
first stage is the period from the end of World War II to the eighties of the twentieth 
century . Most of the ACAs at that time were created mainly to strengthen the structure 
of post-colonial states . During this time the main impetus for the creation of these 
bodies usually came from within the given country .
The second period of growth in popularity of the ACAs is associated with the end 
of the Cold War and the global wave of democratization of post-soviet authoritarian 
regimes . In the early nineties the ACAs were established under the influence and 
recommendations of the UN and Western development agencies .
The third and most dynamic stage of development is associated with even greater 
pressure from the international organizations which, in the second half of the nine-
ties of the twentieth century, succeeded in formulating the framework for a global 
24 M . Bukovansky, Corruption Is Bad: Normative Dimensions of the Anti-corruption Movement, Aus-
tralian National University, Working Paper 2002, http://ips .cap .anu .edu .au/ir/pubs/work_papers/02–5 .
pdf . Accessed 11 August 2012 .
25 D . Dionisie, F . Checchi, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Agencies in Eastern Europe, ANCOR-
AGE-NET Working Papers 2008, http://ancorage-net .org/content/documents/dionisie-checchi-corrup-
tion_in_ee .pdf . Accessed 11 August 2012 .
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anti-corruption policy . The culmination of constructing this policy was the adoption 
in 2000 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption which made the creation 
of anti-corruption agencies compulsory for all signatory countries . Thus, in the early 
twenty-first century, ACAs became the standard tool for counteracting corruption .
A further interesting conclusion we may draw from this short historical analysis 
is that the agencies created in the first period usually had a quite narrow special-
ization . The first ACAs were created in response to a concrete, specific situation 
in a given country . For example, the creation of special anti-corruption bodies 
in the U . S . almost always had their origin in a specific scandal . The first American 
anti-corruption unit was established in New York, to investigate the Tammany Hall 
scandal (1860 s) . It was similar in the case of Asian and Australian bodies . These 
early ACAs were focused on fighting administrative corruption, which was mainly 
related to their “police roots” . Agencies in Singapore, Hong Kong and in New South 
Wales were established simply as special police units, and their first task was to fight 
corruption within the police .
As corruption has become globalized and its definition expanded, the ACAs have 
also broadened their scope . Nowadays they are expected to fight any kind of behavior 
classified by international conventions as corrupt . For almost all anti-corruption 
agencies established during the third wave the main purpose is fighting corruption, 
defined as a phenomenon far beyond the basic forms of crime occurring within 
administrative structures such as bribery or cronyism . Modern ACAs are supposed 
to deal with political corruption, corruption in the private sector or the banking 
sector (e .g . money laundering, which is often treated as a form of corruption) or 
in professional sport . The ACAs have also expanded their activities, as is expressed 
in broader competences and increased funding .
This evolution of anti-corruption agencies is related to the changes in the per-
ception of corruption . At the end of the nineteenth century, corruption ceased to be 
considered as a problem of philosophical and moral nature; its practical conse-
quences, and above all the fact that it causes dysfunctionality of state bodies, started 
to attract more attention from researchers, policymakers and public opinion . This 
“rationalization” of corruption paved the way for the creation of new very concrete 
anti-corruption measures26 . An international anti-corruption campaign that was 
launched in the mid-nineties of the twentieth century broadened the definition of 
corruption, forming it in terms of a global social problem . This factor had a serious 
impact on the ACAs – the reasons why they had been established, what purposes 
26 P . Meagher, Anti-corruption Agencies: Rhetoric Versus Reality, “Journal of Policy Reform” 2005, 
Vol . 8, No . 1, p . 70 .
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they served and what functions they performed . While the first ACAs were created 
by particular governments in order to solve the social problem of corruption as 
defined, managed and owned by them, those agencies established from the early 
nineties, were created mainly in response to the recommendations, expectations and 
pressure of the international community .
This process is somewhat similar to Anechiarico and Jacobs’ account of “pursuit 
of absolute integrity”27 . They analyzed anti-corruption policies in the U . S ., looking 
more in-depth at the struggle against corruption in New York City . They identified 
four specific periods of anti-corruption development . The years 1870–1900 were the 
time of domination of the corrupt political machine, based on the spoils system and 
patronage . At that time there was no coherent anti-corruption policy . The period 
1900–1933 they call the Progressive Era . At that time the risk of corruption in the 
United States could be greatly reduced by the development and implementation of 
ideas of apolitical administration and a professional, ethical civil service . The next 
period, between 1933 and 1970 is the time when a scientific view on the management 
of public administration became popular . This was the period of the birth of the New 
Public Management paradigm . It was also the time when belief that bureaucracies 
are not able to control the risk of corruption independently was cemented . It was 
discovered that they need external monitoring instruments – professional audit, con-
trol by investigation units specialized in analyzing irregularities in the public sector, 
by watchdog NGOs, etc . The fourth period, between the end of the 70’s and 90’s of 
the last century, Anechiarico and Jacobs label Panoptic . At that time the emphasis 
was put on strengthening control and the development of surveillance instruments 
to curb corruption . The case of New York in their opinion is extreme . The pursuit of 
absolute integrity in the city authorities made it a completely ungovernable structure . 
Anechiarico and Jacobs use the example of New York as an argument that excessive 
focus on reducing corruption does not necessarily go hand in hand with improving 
the quality of management . Also, the expectation that anti-corruption agencies can 
be a silver bullet to corruption is rooted in such a rationalistic view on this problem . 
However, Anechiarico and Jacobs’ argument suggests that when such a silver bullet 
is used as dogma, it may easily make the ACAs lapse into irrationality .
27 F . Anechiarico, J . B . Jacobs, The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity. How Corruption Makes Government 
Ineffective, The University Press of Chicago, Chicago 1996 .
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Why do ACAs fail? The constructivist argument
Available data allow us to formulate the opinion that despite anti-corruption 
agencies having become so popular, they are not very successful in performing their 
functions . The main reason why the ACAs are not able to fight corruption effectively 
lies in the nature of modern corruption, which is a diffused social problem .
As it was said earlier, in the case of corruption organizational ownership of this 
problem, and therefore the ability to define and determine the methods to counteract 
it, remains in the hands of those who initiated the process of constructing the social 
problem – international organizations, not national governments . When it comes 
to legitimizing the social problem of corruption in any given country, national gov-
ernments have little to say . To see this, it is enough to analyze the legal definitions 
of corruption which we find in national legislations: first and foremost they must 
respond to the requirements of international anti-corruption conventions .
Lack of ownership of the social problem of corruption limits the freedom of choice 
of national governments as to what measures should be taken to curb corruption . 
Such a limitation is reflected especially by the UN Convention against Corruption, 
requiring signatory countries to adopt very concrete regulations (e .g . to penalize 
concrete behaviors in criminal codes or adopt special legislation to protect whistle-
blowers) and to create institutions prescribed by the convention, among which are 
anti-corruption agencies28 .
Taking this into account, it should be no surprise that most anti-corruption agen-
cies, especially in developing countries, were established solely as the fulfilment of 
the requirements imposed on them by international standards, without any deeper 
analysis of the problem of corruption in a given country and the country-specific 
solutions . This must have an impact on how the mission, goals and competences of 
the ACAs are defined and, as a result, how they function . One of the consequences 
is a sort of automatism in designing anti-corruption policies manifested in copying 
and applying the ACA models from other countries (usually from Hong Kong and 
Singapore – considered as the most successful) .
Simple cloning ACAs from country to country often happens on the advice of 
international experts, who rarely have an in-depth knowledge of the political, social, 
cultural or economic determinants of the corruption and anti-corruption policies 
28 K . Hussmann, H . Hechler, H . Peñailill, Institutional Arrangements for Corruption Prevention: 
Considerations for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption Article 6, U4 
Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Bergen 2009 .
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in a given country . As a result their advice contributes to the creation of institutions 
that basically do not fit the local reality and in the end are ineffective – they lack 
political support and this results in poor legislation, resources and capabilities – and 
such institutions are not embedded in broader anti-corruption policies (if there are 
any), and also often suffer from low accountability . This is, as we will see later on, 
what happened in the case of most African and Asian ACAs, but also in Central and 
Eastern Europe .
Conditions of ACA’s success
Successful ACAs should fulfil some basic requirements . In one of his articles 
based on a unique survey of high officials of anti-corruption agencies from fourteen 
countries de Sousa29, basing on his extensive survey of top ACAs officials from differ-
ent countries identified several basic criteria the ACAs need to meet to be effective . 
Among them probably the most important are:
• a clearly defined mission and purpose; it should also be an element of a broad, 
horizontal, anti-corruption policy,
• broad political consensus,
• competences relevant to its mission purposes and resources,
• appropriate legislative framework,
• organizational culture promoting good leadership and high qualifications of 
its officials,
• good communication with other institutions dealing with corruption society and 
the international community .
Only by meeting these standards may the ACAs have a chance to be effective in-
stitutions . Unfortunately, the conclusion from de Sousa’s analysis and other reports is 
that around the world there are few agencies which completely follow these principles .
Researchers analyzing anti-corruption agencies stress that the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption agencies is largely dependent on the motivations underlying the 
decisions to create them30 . Lack of real political will to fight corruption and the 
simple desire to please the international community in this matter cannot be a solid 
basis for creating an effective anti-corruption agency . But what other motivations 
may governments (or at least most of them, especially after 2003) find to create and 
29 L . de Sousa, Anti-corruption Agencies . . ., op .cit .
30 Ibidem; P . Meagher, Anti-Corruption Agencies, op .cit .; OECD: Specialized Anti-Corruption Institu-
tions. Review of Models, OECD, Paris 2007 .
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effectively use specialized anti-corruption agencies to fight a globalized, diffused 
social problem which they can hardly control? This is a problem which is difficult 
to define and even more challenging to operationalize for the purposes of a special 
anticorruption institution . This is a paradoxical situation and it might be expected that 
the authorities in such a situation would be driven by purely pragmatic motivation . 
Therefore, the ACAs’ true purpose will not be limiting corruption, but (at best) only 
to control and keep it away from the political debate .
In most cases analyzed so far (as we will see in the next chapter), the ACAs are 
institutions prone to be used instrumentally in the political struggle or which are even 
themselves corrupt . The ACAs quickly become victims of politicians who, by creating 
an anti-corruption agency, present themselves as those who have fulfilled the highest 
international standards for combating corruption and have done their best to secure 
society form this terrible social problem . Such institutions definitely cannot play 
the role of an actor capable of making, or even initiating, any systemic change (e .g . 
reform of the party financing system) which is often necessary to limit corruption .
Diffusion of the social problem of corruption and the institutional ownership 
lying beyond national authorities, are two factors which make ACAs around the 
world (and especially those established since the mid-nineties on the growing wave 
of the global anti-corruption crusade), ineffective .
Of course there might be other explanations why the ACAs are dysfunctional . 
A general reluctance among politicians to establish anti-corruption agencies, or a ten-
dency to create facade institutions, may be motivated by other reasons than just the 
nature of the problem of corruption . Dysfunctions may be due to the current political 
situation in a given country; they might be related to the character of the political 
system or the quality of political elites . An unclear mission or low ACA capacity may 
be due to the generally low organizational and management skills specific to the whole 
public sector in a given country . In such circumstances it will be unrealistic to expect 
that the ACA quality will be above average . Literature indicating more or less direct 
causes of the problems of anti-corruption agencies is discussed in the next chapter .
An interesting alternative argument might be derived from Bryane’s (2004) 
analysis of the globalized diffusion of anticorruption policies . As an expert in the 
field of management studies, he stresses that if, and how effectively, anticorruption 
innovations are adapted by given societies and states heavily depends on how they are 
being transferred to the particular organizations . He proposes looking at this question 
through two perspectives: (1) organizational-led and (2) institutional-led diffusion 
of knowledge . Briefly, the first one is the situation when anticorruption policies are 
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being copied or emulated by one organization or state to another31 . Here, possible 
failures in transmission usually result from local, country or organizational speci-
ficity or inappropriate and incomplete information . As an example Bryane32 points 
to attempts of the World Bank, UN, or OECD or powerful development agencies 
(such as USAid or DFID) to spread anticorruption policies around the world . As 
was also mentioned earlier such efforts, especially when the creation of an ACA is 
at stake, are in most cases unsuccessful . Within the second model (institutional-led) 
it is assumed that knowledge exists somewhere “out there” (e .g . within social or 
policy networks) and factors like values, norms or culture characteristic to a given 
organization or country determine if knowledge (or policy) is transferred effectively 
or not . Transfer of an anticorruption policy will fail if an adapter is not prepared 
to operate according to an appropriate ‘mental model’, or is not able to learn and 
produce knowledge . Therefore, from such a perspective the ACA does not work 
effectively because the whole system (political, social, cultural, etc .) ignores values 
of transparency, accountability or good governance .
Here the existence of other factors is not denied, apart from the diffused nature 
of corruption, negatively affecting the ACAs . However, various factors may simply 
coincide with each other . By arguing that the character of the social problem of 
corruption is crucial to the ultimate success or failure of anti-corruption agencies 
another more horizontal (meso) perspective is brought . The hypothesis here is that 
diffusion of social corruption is a sort of pre-condition that generates other, more 
immediate problems for the ACAs, such as lack of resources, an inadequate legal 
basis or organizational problems .
Common dysfunctions of ACAs. Some illustrations 
from available research
As it was already said the main result of attempts of counteracting diffused social 
problem of corruption over which governments have no “organizational control” is 
that the ACAs are often established without political support and often become only 
façade institutions . An example here might be the Korean anti-corruption commission 
31 D . Dolowitz, D . Marsh, Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy 
Making, Governance 2000, Vol . 13, No . 1, p . 5–24 .
32 M . Bryane, The Globalization of Anticorruption Policies: The Diffusion of Best Practicies and the 
Role of Knowledge Management, in: D . Levi-Faur, E . Vigoda-Gadot (Ed .), International Public Policy and 
Management. Policy Learning Beyond Regional, Cultural, and Political Boudaries, Marcel Dekker, New 
York 2004 .
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(KICAC), formed after a series of corruption scandals as proof of the government’s 
determination to fight corruption, but at the same time deprived of investigation and 
prosecution competences33 (Quah, 2006) .
This is also why anti-corruption agencies become victims of political struggle and 
are treated instrumentally by decision makers . This was the case of the Malaysian 
Anti-Corruption Central Office, which is almost fully dependent on the prime min-
ister and the king, which makes it unreliable in the eyes of public opinion which sees 
this institution as a tool to fight political opposition . This is also the problem of the 
Polish Central Anti-corruption Bureau which is dependent solely on the prime min-
ister’s will and the current political composition of the parliament34 . Very interesting 
insight on this can be also found in Robert Gregory’s paper Political independence, 
operational impartiality, and the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies35 .
They often have unrealistic goals . Governments establishing ACAs (as a result of 
UNCAC ratification) expect that they will counteract every form of corruption (or 
even other crimes or threats), perform analytical activities and take care of infor-
mation and public education36 . There is a tendency to create multipurpose agencies 
or powerful law enforcement bodies with broad competences but few financial and 
human resources . As a result, the ACAs fail to achieve their goal, which lowers their 
social prestige and public confidence . This is the problem of the ACAs in Uganda 
and Zambia and other African agencies37 .
A common shortcoming of the ACAs which are at the same time law enforcement 
bodies is an emphasis on the repressive functions, which often leads to the brutalization 
of the anti-corruption activities and even abuse of democratic standards and human 
rights . The Singapore CPIB and Polish CBA are often criticized for this reason38 .
The decision to establish an anti-corruption agency should be a part of a broader 
anti-corruption policy; however, many agencies are created without such a plan 
or strategy and become the “fifth wheel of the coach” . They do not fit the anti-cor-
ruption framework, if any exists, and from the very beginning are in conflict with 
33 J . S . T . Quah, Curbing Asian Corruption: An Impossible Dream?, “Current History” 2006, Vol . 105, 
No . 690 .
34 G . Makowski, Socjologiczna analiza…, op .cit .
35 Gregory, 2015 .
36 See: K . Ernie, S . Yu-Chang, Y ., Chilik, Sibling rivalry among anti-corruption agencies in Taiwan: Is 
redundancy doomed to fail?, Asian Education and Development Studies 2015, Vol . 4, No . 1, p . 101–124 .
37 A . Doig, D . Watt, R . Williams, Measuring ‘success’ in five African Anti-Corruption Commissions 
Measuring ‘success’, Chr . Michelsen Institute, Bergen 2005 .
38 P . Meagher, Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Review of Experience . University of Maryland: Center for 
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, 2004, p . 3; G . Makowski, Socjologiczna analiza…, op .cit .
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other institutions dealing with this problem . This was a problem of the Croatian 
agency (USKOK)39 .
Even in the case of agencies which are widely believed to be successful, as in Hong 
Kong or New South Wales, it is difficult to adduce evidence that corruption was limited 
solely thanks to their work40 . In these cases, the establishment of an agency was part of 
the wider anti-corruption strategy, which included reforms of the administration and 
implementation of new criminal law, etc . The ACAs also never operate in a vacuum; 
regardless of their degree of specialization, there are always other institutions, which 
do a similar job and are complementary to them41 . Therefore, even if we can say that 
in Hong Kong and New South Wales the scale of corrupt incidents was reduced, the 
existing data will not prove that this resulted solely from actions taken by the ACA .
Meagher42 draws attention to yet another obstacle in attempts to evaluate the 
ACA effectiveness . In general, there is a very limited range of data which are usually 
made public  by these kind of institutions . Therefore trying to answer the question 
whether the ACAs are a good or bad tool in fighting corruption, we immediately face 
very fundamental problems . Nonetheless answers these questions should be sought, 
bearing in mind the following points: 1) ACAs, as shown earlier, became a standard 
element of the global anti-corruption policy . 2) The international community and 
taxpayers in many countries have already made significant financial commitments 
to these institutions . 3) Identifying factors of success or failure in existing ACAs 
requires empirical analysis, especially taking into account the fact that conclusions 
drawn from the available data are not promising .
One of the first and best known studies of anti-corruption agencies is the Mea-
gher report of 2004 . He used the case study technique to analyze the ACAs operating 
in Argentina, Malaysia and Tanzania and several other agencies, including most 
famously the Hong Kong ICAC and Singapore’s CPIB . The study strengthened the 
arguments in favor of the hypothesis that we cannot expect that ACAs will be the 
only, or even the major, factor which may reduce the scale of corruption . One of 
the most valuable observations we may draw from this report is that the overall 
effectiveness of the ACAs is very dependent on the moment and the circumstances 
in which they are created . Often, as Meagher noted, the authorities decide to establish 
an anti-corruption agency in response to a specific scandal or (as in the case of devel-
oped democratic countries), in response to the negative assessment of the previous 
39 D . Dionisie, F . Checchi, op .cit .
40 D . Kaufmann, Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies: Tilt Towards Incentive-Driven Approaches, in: 
Corruption & Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries, UNDP, New York 1998 .
41 P . Meagher, Anti-Corruption Agencies, op .cit ., p . 29 .
42 Ibidem .
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cabinet and ruling party . An important impulse for establishing an anti-corruption 
agency is also pressure from international organizations . However, no matter what 
the decisive factor is, the ACA always has a chance to be successful if it is a part of 
a broader anti-corruption strategy, and if the decision to establish it results from 
political consensus43 . Only in this way can an agency gain a strong position and 
long-term political support . Meagher gives examples of Singapore, Hong Kong, USA 
and New South Wales ACAs as success stories on the one hand, and on the other 
hand Tanzania and Botswana, where agencies were established simply in reaction 
to scandals and quickly lost their operational capability . The Tanzanian Prevention 
of Corruption Bureau (Taasisi Kuzuia Rushwa ya Tanzania), for instance, obtained 
very weak competences, low financial support and suffered a lack of public support 
(citizens simply did not even know that such an institution existed) . These factors, 
combined with the lack of political consensus and a horizontal anti-corruption 
strategy, in the end led to the failure of the Tanzanian ACA .
A further important conclusion from Meagher’s analysis concerns the scope of 
activities of the ACAs . In creating such an institution one needs to consider carefully 
what purposes it should serve . It is necessary to define agency functions in such 
a way that it will be able to counteract corruption and at the same time demonstrate 
its effectiveness to the public . This sounds easy, but when we take into account that 
nowadays corruption is very broadly defined, it is impossible for one institution 
to deal with the whole extent of this problem . Also, because of this broad defini-
tion it is difficult to narrow the ACA’s scope and prove that it is fighting corruption 
really effectively . A thoughtless desire to copy the Hong Kong model (ICAC is the 
biggest and best funded, most existing ACAs have less than half of its budget) will 
end in failure . This is what happened in the case of ACAs established in Uganda, 
Thailand and the Philippines; a multi-purpose agency like the Hong Kong ICAC 
must have sufficient financial, human and technical resources, and these countries 
simply could not afford to create agencies like the Hong Kong ICAC . Thus, in decid-
ing to establish an anti-corruption agency, it is reasonable to reject the ICAC model 
and clearly define the tasks and areas of activity of the institution according to the 
country-specific situation .
Yet another important issue discussed by Meagher is the accountability of 
the ACAs . Case studies show the ACAs have a tendency which is typical for all 
bureaucratic structures – to shut themselves into their own world and start living 
their own lives, becoming difficult to control . Anti-corruption agencies usually face 
43 See: A . Mungiu-Pippidi, (Ed .), Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lesson Learned, 2011, 
http://www .oecd .org/countries/zambia/48912957 .pdf Accessed 20 October 2015, p . 32, 52 .
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serious problems of transparency, especially those agencies of a law enforcement 
character with broad investigation and prosecution competences . These problems of 
accountability were somewhat solved in only two cases – the Hong Kong ICAC and 
its counterpart in New South Wales (recently however the NSW ICAC changed this 
mechanism, and currently the Commission is supervised by the special Inspector 
of the Independent Commission Against Corruption and the NSW Parliamentary 
Committee on the ICAC) . In both cases citizens are allowed to supervise these in-
stitutions directly, through special consultative bodies and councils who may order 
an audit over all activities of the ACAs . Without guarantees of accountability and 
transparency, due to the very political nature of corruption itself, the ACAs often 
become a tool in the hands of decision makers, seeking not to curb corruption but 
to use it in the political struggle .
Another interesting study of functioning of the central anti-corruption agencies 
in five African countries – Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia was done 
by Doig, Watt and Williams (2005); many findings from this study overlap with 
Meager’s report . Maybe the most important conclusion from the analysis of African 
ACAs is that these institutions were created not because of an internal need to fight 
corruption, but only under strong pressure from international organizations, without 
proper diagnosis of the situation . African decision makers in fact had no motivation 
to establish effective institutions to limit corruption but only to satisfy foreign donors . 
The decision to establish the ACAs was not based on a coherent anti-corruption policy 
and genuine political will to deal with the problem . This, combined with unrealistic 
expectations (African ACAs were modelled again on the Hong Kong model) could 
not bring good results . Doig, Watt and Williams document here an important factor 
associated with the circumstances in which the ACAs are usually created – the im-
pact of external claims-makers, demanding anti-corruption policy changes . African 
countries are only a few of the examples supporting the hypothesis that the lack of 
compatibility and synchronization between the objectives, opportunities, realities, 
motivations and expectations of governments and public opinion on the one hand, 
and the international organizations calling for establishment of anti-corruption 
agencies on the other hand, may lead to a permanent lack of effectiveness of the 
anti-corruption agencies .
Dionisi and Checchi44 draw similar conclusions . They analyzed the ACAs in Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania . The example of the Romanian Agency 
(Romania Anti-corruption Directorate – NAD) which, before this country joined 
the European Union in 2007, started investigating several high-ranking Romanian 
44 D . Dionisi, F . Checchi, op .cit .
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politicians, is particularly interesting . These cases were of course presented as suc-
cesses of the government in curbing corruption . However, immediately after joining 
the EU the investigations were stopped and the cases did not reach court . A very 
similar situation happened in Bulgaria .
Conclusion and one more hypothesis for further 
research on ACAs
What lessons may be drawn from the rather negative experiences of existing an-
ti-corruption agencies? Is there any chance to create a really effective anti-corruption 
agency in the context of constructivist explanation of the failures of the institution? 
Yes, of course, but some basic conditions have to be met .
As was mentioned before, there are several central anti-corruption agencies which 
are considered to be successful – the Hong Kong ICAC and its sister commission 
from New South Wales (Australia), the Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation 
Bureau, the US Office of Government Ethics . These institutions (at least at some 
point) were successful due to the fact that the social problem of corruption – which 
they were established to fight against – was not diffused .
The ACAs in these countries were created in order to fight concrete, clearly 
defined forms of corruption, whose causes were identified in specific professional 
groups (problem populations) – the police or public administration45 . Corruption 
was effectively personalized, and thus also instrumentalization of the problem and 
moving it to the very operational level, where anti-corruption agencies are active, 
was possible . Governments which decided to create these ACAs had full ownership 
of the problem and were not pressured by international actors . They were fully sov-
ereign in their decisions . The Independent Commission Against Corruption in New 
South Wales was even created by the autonomous decision of one of the Australian 
states – the Australian federal government did not interfere . Thus, the organizational 
ownership of corruption remained in the hands of the authorities responsible for 
solving or controlling this social problem .
In such circumstances creating a special helping profession dealing with corruption 
was reasonable and could bring, and indeed brought, expected results . Therefore, 
in conclusion one more explanatory hypothesis which could be verified in further 
research on the ACAs .
45 J . S . T . Quah, Defying Institutional Failure…, op .cit .; T . Wing Lo, Corruption and Politics in Hong 
Kong and China, Open University Press, Buckingham 1993 .
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Only when the social problem of corruption is not diffused, when it might be 
personalized, effectively instrumentalized and when ownership of the social problem 
of corruption belongs to the national authorities who are responsible for creating 
public policies and accountable for them, may anti-corruption agencies have a real 
chance to work effectively .
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